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A Model of Errors and Irregularities as a 
General Framework for Risk-Based Audit Planning 
Jere R.Francis 
University of Missouri 
Richard A. Grimlund 
University of Iowa 
INTRODUCTION 
Auditing standards define the objective of an audit as providing assurance that financial 
statements are presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
Exactly how this should be achieved has been a subject of much interest in recent years. Now, because 
of SAS 58, the term "presented fairly" requires that the auditor must obtain reasonable assurance that 
the financial statements are free of material misstatements. This is in addition to the historical role of 
gathering positive evidence to support the assertion that the financial statements conform to GAAP, as 
applied on a consistent basis.1 
SAS 53, issued at the same time as SAS 58, provides some guidance with respect to the auditor's 
evaluation of whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements (hereafter called errors 
and irregularities). For example SAS 53, paragraph 6, states: 
The auditor should assess the risks that errors and irregularities may cause 
financial statements to contain material misstatements. Based on that 
assessment, the auditor should design the audit to provide reasonable assurance 
of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the financial statements. 
The auditor's assessment of the material misstatement of financial statements 
requires the auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and irregularities... 
Based on that understanding, the auditor develops and performs appropriate 
audit procedures and evaluates the results. 
Of particular importance are the last two sentences which require the auditor to understand the 
"characteristics" of errors and irregularities, and based on that "understanding" to develop appropriate 
audit procedures. 
In line with SAS 53, the purpose of our paper is facilitate the auditor's understanding of the 
characteristics of errors and irregularities. This is a necessary first step to fully implement the kind of 
risk-based auditing articulated in SASs 53 and 58. We do this by developing a model of financial 
statement errors and irregularities that can be used to assist in the process of risk-based audit planning.2 
The objective of the model, to echo SAS 53, is to better understand the "characteristics of errors and 
irregularities" with a goal of planning "appropriate audit procedures" in order for the auditor to have 
"reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities." 
1 The scope paragraph of the standard audit report as required by SAS 58 makes this responsibility explicit. 
2 We do not claim that ours is the only analysis of errors and irregularities. For example Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961, Chapter 6) evaluate sources of financial statement misstatements and how the auditor may detect them. 
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There are several reasons for developing such a model. First, and most obvious, existing audit 
standards do not provide the kind of detailed guidance necessary to implement SAS 53 and SAS 58.3 
Second, the academic research that has modeled errors and/or irregularities has been at an abstract level 
that cannot provide detailed guidance in the field.4 Third, field auditors appear to have rather limited 
personal experience in discovering errors and irregularities due to low occurrence rates [e.g., 
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986, Loebbecke et al. 1989, Willingham and Wright, 1985]. This lack of 
experience hinders the development of both an underlying knowledge base as well as the cognitive 
structures required for organizing knowledge of misstatements into the "procedural knowledge" 
necessary for the development of problem solving expertise.5 Thus, besides providing a framework for 
assisting the auditor in audit planning, a model of errors and irregularities also provides more general 
benefits to auditors and students in learning, elaborating, and evaluating risk-based auditing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section defines the two basic elements of 
the model: (1) sources of errors and irregularities and (2) types of financial statement transactions. The 
model is then formally developed and presented in section three. The model shows how specific 
sources of errors/irregularities logically align with particular types of transactions. This leads to 
propositions about (1) the presence of specific sources of risk in particular components of the financial 
statements and (2) the risk-based audit planning implications. The analysis concludes by examining 
audit testing strategies in terms of the broad choice between internal control testing (and reliance) and 
substantive tests. 
The model serves as a general framework for risk-based audit planning in the following manner. First it 
guides the auditor in identifying which particular populations of transactions/balances to test (in terms 
of the underlying risk of misstatements) and specifies the audit testing objectives (based on the nature of 
possible misstatements). Second it further guides the planning process by carefully delineating the roles 
of internal control testing and substantive testing for particular populations of transactions and account 
balances. In sum, with a model of errors and irregularities it is possible to plan and design appropriate 
audit tests in terms of what to audit and why, with respect to specific sources of errors and irregularities 
in the financial statements. 
A preliminary caveat is in order with respect to the model. The model developed here is generic in the 
sense that it would be universally applicable to all engagements. However, it is not meant to be a 
complete, all-inclusive planning framework. The model would necessarily have to be supplemented by 
3 Nor to the best of our knowledge have accounting firms developed anything comparable to the model of errors 
and irregularities we present in this paper. Readers are referred to disclosures by several of the major 
accounting firms of their proprietary auditing methodologies [e.g., Elliott (1983), Felix et al. (1990), Grobstein 
and Craig (1984), Leslie et al. (1986), Mullarkey (1984), Sullivan (1984), Walker and Pierce (1988)]. See also 
Kneer (1984) for a summary of the (then) Deloitte Haskins & Sells approach (which was also disseminated in 
the early 1980s at DH&S Auditscope seminars held around the country). In related work, Cushing and 
Loebbecke (1983) surveyed accounting firms' approaches to assessing audit risk. 
4 Audit testing models have generally drawn on either Bayesian decision theory (Bailey 1981, Kinney 1975, 
Srivastava and Shafer 1992) or game theory (Fellingham and Newman 1985, Matsumura and Tucker 1992, 
Morton 1993). These models are not operational nor are they necessarily intended to be. Rather, they are fairly 
abstract and stylized models designed to elucidate and better understand salient features of the global audit 
testing process. 
5 For general discussions of the cognitive development of auditor expertise see Bonner and Pennington (1991), 
Gibbins (1988), and Waller and Felix (1984). See also Ashton (1991) for an experimental study which 
underscores the critical role played by the auditor's knowledge of errors and irregularities in problem solving 
and the development of expertise, and the possible limits to expertise due to the auditor's limited experience 
with misstatements. 
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special engagement-specific audit risk concerns identified by the auditor. In addition, materiality 
decisions might either override or emphasize particular planning implications of the model. Finally, 
even though this study develops a formal model of errors and irregularities, the study is actually an 
example of applied auditing research and represents a response to recent calls for research into audit 
approaches (Akresh et al. 1988); for more realistic modeling in audit research (Solomon and Krogstad 
1988, p. 10); for studying auditing in context and as a field of research in its own right (Johnson et al. 
1989); and for greater relevance of academic research to the problems of accounting practice (Black et 
al. 1990). 
DEFINITIONS OF ELEMENTS USED IN THE MODEL 
The model of errors and irregularities that is developed in the next section is based on the interaction of 
two elements: (1) sources of misstatements in financial statements and (2) what the auditor audits, i.e., 
the types of transactions in financial statements. Specifically, the model analyzes interactions between 
three general sources of financial statement misstatements (random error, asset misappropriation, and 
financial statement manipulation) and two general types of financial statement transactions, completed 
and incomplete, with a further distinction between internally- and externally-generated transaction 
recognition. 
Before defining these two elements of the model some brief observations on the relationship between 
transactions and financial statements are helpful. Auditors express an opinion on financial statements 
taken as a whole. However, financial statements are, by definition, the summarization of transaction 
recognition and valuation that has occurred in accounting journals. This means that the risk of a 
financial statement misstatement is really the risk that individual transactions have not been properly 
recognized and/or valued. Thus in auditing financial statements the auditor is ultimately expressing an 
opinion on whether or not the underlying transactions (that constitute the financial statements) are 
materially misstated. For this reason it is logical to model errors and irregularities in financial 
statements in terms of the underlying transactions that constitute the financial statements. 
The two basic elements of the model are now discussed. First, sources of financial misstatements are 
presented based on definitions and categories in SAS 53. Then types of transactions are presented. This 
material is more complex and is a unique aspect of the study. It builds on two key ideas: (1) the notion 
of the completeness or incompleteness of transactions and (2) whether transaction recognition originates 
internally or externally. 
Sources of Financial Statement Misstatements 
Based on definitions in SAS 53, material misstatements may occur from either (1) errors which 
are "unintentional" in origin or (2) irregularities which are "intentional" misstatements (see paragraphs 
2-3 of SAS 53). Errors occur from mistakes in underlying data, from incorrect accounting estimates, 
and from mistakes in applying generally accepted accounting principles. Hereafter, errors will be 
referred to as random errors to delineate them from irregularities and to emphasize the underlying risk 
(i.e., randomness). By contrast, irregularities are intentional in origin. SAS 53 further subdivides 
irregularities into (a) the misappropriation of assets and concealment in accounting records (also called 
defalcations), (b) outright theft of assets (misappropriation without concealment in accounting records) 
and (c) fraudulent manipulation of the financial statements (also called management fraud). No further 
consideration is given in this paper to item (b), outright asset theft, because the auditee's physical 
controls over assets and other asset accountability procedures (e.g., bank reconciliations, physical 
inventories) are assumed to normally prevent or detect such theft.6 
6 Even if these internal controls are not adequate, the audit tests suggested by the model should also detect 
outright asset theft (see audit planning implications P4 and P6). 
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Types of Transactions: Completed and Incomplete, and Internal Versus External 
For simplicity we initially characterize accounting transactions as originating from a bilateral 
economic exchange between the auditee and another party. While this represents the majority of 
accounting transactions, we later relax this definition to deal with what we term unilateral or internally-
generated recognition by an auditee. An economic exchange can be temporally classified as initially 
incomplete and then being subsequently completed. The exchange remains incomplete until all of the 
underlying economic activity required by the auditee and the other party to the exchange is fully 
completed by both parties. For example, a credit sale is initially "incomplete" and remains so until 
payment is received from the debtor. At this later date the credit sale, which was originally incomplete, 
becomes completed.7 Similarly, a credit purchase is initially incomplete and then becomes "completed" 
when cash is disbursed or the account payable is otherwise debited (e.g., purchase returns). 
Some exchanges are more complex, such as sales with right of return or with warranties. Nevertheless, 
they can be classified as completed or incomplete by decomposing the exchanges into their constituent 
components. For example, a sale with warranty can be analyzed as having a conventional sale 
component which is completed when cash is received and a warranty component which remains 
incomplete (warranty liability) until the warranty period expires. 
The completion of purchases is also more complex than suggested above. For purchases a distinction 
must be made between the acquisition of goods and services and their subsequent use if the use extends 
beyond the current fiscal year.8 For example, the acquisition of inventory is completed when payment 
is made to vendors. However, the inventory account balance represents incomplete use of the inventory 
by the auditee. Inventory becomes used or completed when the goods are subsequently sold to 
customers (i.e., the completion of an economic exchange of inventory between the auditee and 
customer).9 Similarly, the purchase of fixed assets is completed when cash is disbursed to vendors, 
whereas the use of fixed assets is economically completed when the assets are retired and written off 
(i.e., fully used up in production for the generation of revenues).10 
Completed and Incomplete Transactions. The preceding discussion about completed and incomplete 
economic exchanges is mirrored in the accounting transactions that are recognized in the financial 
7 A credit sale may be completed other than by cash collection: (1) if the account receivable is written off as 
uncollectible or (2) if a contra-sale occurs, i.e., sales return or sales discount. The point here is that all of these 
are mechanisms through which the account receivable is credited, and the outstanding debit amount removed 
(completed) from the account balance. 
8 Purchase transactions that represent periodic operating expenses (i.e., selling, general, and administrative 
expenses) are "completed" when cash is paid. Since these transactions are periodic expenses it is not necessary 
to make a distinction between acquisition and use, that is, acquisition and use take place in the same accounting 
period except for year-end accruals. 
9 Since the manufacturing of goods and the placing of them in finished goods inventory only leads to internal 
accounting transfers, the acquisition of inventory (and its conversion to finished goods) is completed when the 
final product is sold to an external party. The intermediate accounting consists only of internal cost transfers 
from one inventory account to another. 
10 It can be argued that partial completion occurs each year through periodic recognition of depreciation 
expense. However, as will be seen it is more useful to define completion as total (100%) completion. This 
means that a fixed asset remains incomplete until retirement, and depreciation expense is a periodic valuation 
adjustment to the asset. 
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statements. This is the basis for the two kinds of accounting transactions in the model. Incomplete 
accounting transactions represent those economic exchanges that remain incomplete at the end of the 
fiscal period. Completed accounting transactions, by contrast, represent those economic exchanges 
that have been completed during a fiscal period. Thus economic exchanges lead to two distinct types of 
accounting transactions: (1) the initial recognition of an incomplete exchange (e.g., credit sale) and (2) 
the subsequent recognition of the completion of the exchange (e.g., cash receipt). 
Internal Versus External Recognition. A further distinction is made between (1) transaction 
recognition originating in direct response to a bilateral exchange with an external party, i.e., externally-
generated recognition and (2) transaction recognition that unilaterally results from the auditee's own 
internal accounting procedures, i.e., internally-generated recognition. The majority of accounting 
transactions (both completed and incomplete) are external and the preceding examples implicitly 
assumed this to be the case. For example, credit sales and credit purchases, and the subsequent cash 
receipts and disbursements are recognized in direct response to billings, and to subsequent cash 
outflows or inflows with the other party to the economic exchange. These kinds of externally-generated 
bilateral transactions are normally supported by source documents to/from external parties, have a 
visible audit trail, are high volume in nature, and are recorded in specialized accounting journals such 
as sales, purchases, payroll, cash receipts and cash disbursements. 
While the majority of transactions are external in the sense described above there are also a number of 
important internally-generated transactions. Internally-generated recognition of completed transactions 
pertain to asset write-offs. Specific examples of asset write-offs include: asset retirements (internal 
completion of fixed assets), write-offs of accounts receivable as bad debts (internal completion of sales), 
and write-offs of other assets whose value is totally impaired (internal completion of other assets). In 
all of these cases, the auditee unilaterally completes the underlying economic exchange through the 
action of writing off the asset as having completed its economic value to the firm. These transactions 
are low volume in nature and would normally be recorded in the general journal. 
Internally-generated recognition of incomplete transactions include routine year-end accruals and 
adjusting entries, the recognition of self-constructed assets, and internal inventory transfers from raw 
material to work-in-process to finished goods.11 Another common type of internally-generated 
incomplete transaction is the end-of-period asset valuation adjustment. Examples include valuation 
adjustments to accounts receivable for doubtful accounts, to inventories for cost of goods sold and asset 
write-downs (i.e., lower-of-cost-or-market), to prepaid expenses for periodic amortization, to 
investments for investment loss write-downs, and to fixed assets for periodic depreciation expense or 
for asset impairments. Again, because these transactions are low volume in nature they would normally 
be recorded in the general journal. 
Table 1 summarizes examples of the four types of transactions that have been discussed throughout this 
section, classifying the transactions into the completed and incomplete categories, and further 
subdividing them into internally- and externally-generated recognition. As will be illustrated in the 
next section of the paper, the usefulness of these transaction categories lies in how they logically map to 
particular sources of misstatements and hence lead to an identification of where the auditor should audit 
(i.e., which accounting population) and for what type of risk (i.e., source of misstatement). 
11 While recognition is internally-generated by the auditee's own accounting procedures (rather than a direct 
response to an external party to the exchange), the original notion of an economic exchange being incomplete or 
completed still holds. For example, year-end accruals are "completed" when cash is received or disbursed in the 
next period, self-constructed assets are "completed" when fully depreciated and retired, and inventories are 
"completed" when finished goods are ultimately sold to external parties. 
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A MODEL OF ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES 
The model which is developed in this section formulates a systematic relation between type of 
transaction and source of misstatement. Table 2 summarizes these results as (1) risk propositions and 
(2) preliminary audit planning corollaries and testing implications. Each risk proposition is for a 
specific category or population of transactions and is derived from an analysis of the interaction 
between (1) the presence or absence of specific sources of errors and irregularities (random error, asset 
misappropriation, or financial statement manipulation) and (2) a specific category of transactions 
(completed or incomplete). Each proposition leads to one or more corollaries with respect to 
preliminary audit planning implications. These planning implications focus on the resulting need (or 
lack of need) for audit testing. 
As seen from Table 2, the model's predictions about the risk of errors and irregularities and the resulting 
audit planning implications can be summarized by the following duality. First, because there is very 
little risk of either random error or financial statement manipulation in completed transactions, 
completed transactions normally need only be tested for risk of asset misappropriation. Second, 
because there is a risk of both random error and financial statement manipulation (but no risk of asset 
misappropriation), incomplete transactions normally need to be jointly tested for random error and 
financial statement manipulation. 
Thus the model provides a framework for preliminary audit planning based on the specific populations 
of transactions that are (or are not) normally in need of testing for specific sources of misstatement. In 
keeping with the generalized nature of the planning framework, the model does not initially specify 
how the actual audit testing would be done, e.g., control versus substantive tests, or specific types of 
substantive tests (e.g., analytical procedures versus tests of details). However, these broader questions 
of audit testing strategy are reconsidered later in the paper. 
The model is now formally developed beginning with an analysis of completed transactions and each of 
the three sources of misstatements. The same analysis is then undertaken for incomplete transactions. 
Analysis of Completed Transactions 
Risk of Random Errors in Completed Transactions. Random errors in completed transactions can 
occur if transactions are initially recognized and then subsequently completed at an erroneously over -
or understated monetary amount. However, the probability of this is very low. Completed transactions 
are normally subjected to the joint effects of the internal control systems of the two parties to the 
transaction (e.g., the firm and its customers or vendors, or employees in the case of payroll). That is, the 
two internal control systems provide independent checks on the transaction processing and are likely to 
prevent such errors from occurring in the first place, or to correct such errors before the transaction is 
completed.12 
By contrast, completed transactions resulting from internally-generated recognition (see Table 1) do not 
receive the scrutiny of these two internal control systems and consequently random errors could go 
undetected. However, as will be discussed below, internally-completed transactions are directly tested 
for misstatement from asset misappropriation (fraudulent asset write-offs) and hence are subjected to 
audit testing albeit for a different audit objective. Thus because they are subject to testing for asset 
12 If by chance random errors go undetected by both parties' internal control systems, it is not clear that the 
monetary amount of errors in these completed transactions are recoverable or that the financial statements need 
correcting. It can be argued that caveat emptor applies and that there is no financial statement error, per se, if 
these transactions have been voluntarily completed by both parties to the transaction. 
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misappropriation, special audit tests are not necessary for random error in internally-generated 
completed transactions. 
In sum, random errors in externally-generated completed transactions are unlikely. While this is not the 
case for internally-generated completed transactions, they are directly tested elsewhere (see planning 
implication P2b below) and thus do not need to be specially tested for random error. Consequently, 
given the low risk there normally is no reason to test completed transactions, either internally- or 
externally-generated, for random error.13 Formally stated the risk proposition (R1) and preliminary 
audit planning implication (P1) are: 
R1: There is little risk of financial statement misstatement from random error in completed 
transactions. 
P1: Because of the low risk there is no compelling reason to plan audit tests of completed 
transactions for risk of random error. 
Risk of Asset Misappropriation in Completed Transactions. Two types of assets may be 
misappropriated (and concealed): cash and noncash assets. Cash misappropriation is examined first. 
Misappropriation (and concealment) of cash means that transactions have been "fraudulently 
completed" to conceal the misappropriation. The model provides a basis for analyzing which particular 
completed transactions are at risk of being fraudulently completed in order to conceal cash 
misappropriation. Cash misappropriation could occur in either of two ways: (1) through underreporting 
of cash receipts from credit sales (fraudulent completion of sales)14 or (2) through unauthorized 
disbursement of cash (fraudulent completion of purchases or other disbursements). In either case there 
is an understatement of the "true" or non-fraudulent cash balance, and a corresponding understatement 
of net income as a result of the fraudulent completion of the transaction. Each of these is now 
discussed. 
First, consider the fraudulent completion of sales. Misappropriation of cash receipts from credit sales 
can be concealed by fraudulently "completing" sales in a noncash manner. This can occur through 
actions such as bogus sales returns or bogus cash discounts, or through the fraudulent write-off of an 
account as uncollectible. The implication is that noncash completions of credit sales are at risk and 
warrant testing. 
Second, consider fraudulent cash disbursements for purchases. Fraudulent cash disbursements can 
occur through bogus vendor invoices, or from fraudulently overstated dollar amounts on otherwise 
valid purchases. The same is true of cash disbursements for payroll and other disbursements in general. 
13 A random error in completed transactions that could potentially occur and go uncorrected in accounting 
systems is the misclassification of transactions (including the misapplication of GAAP to transactions). If 
misclassification errors exist, and are material, preliminary analytical review may indicate their presence 
through the identification of unusual fluctuations in account balances. Also, to the extent certain populations of 
completed transactions are tested for asset misappropriation (see P2a and P2b in the next section) there is a joint 
test for random error due to misclassification. In particular P2a specifies the testing of cash disbursements 
which is where misclassification errors may be most likely to occur (i.e., a misclassification of expenditures 
such as capitalizing rather than expensing or vice-versa). Misclassification errors could also exist in incomplete 
transactions. However, the testing identified in audit planning corollaries P4 and P6 would fully test for this. 
14 If cash is taken before sales are recorded then this is outright theft rather than misappropriation and 
concealment in the accounting records. The omitted recording of sales is more difficult to audit (the 
completeness assertion) and the auditor normally relies on tests of the client's internal control system and on 
analytical procedures. 
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For example, fraudulent disbursement can occur from payroll ghosting (fictitious employees) or from 
the overstatement of hours and/or pay rates on an otherwise valid payroll payee. The overall 
implication is that all cash disbursements are at risk and warrant testing. 
Noncash asset misappropriation and concealment is now examined for several types of noncash assets 
(accounts receivable was treated as "cash" and evaluated above). First, the theft marketable securities 
can be concealed through a fraudulent asset write-off for impaired value. Second, the misappropriation 
of inventory can occur through a fraudulent completion related to improper inventory write-offs for 
asset impairments. Third, the misappropriation of long-term or fixed assets can be concealed through 
bogus retirement or write-off of the misappropriated assets. In each of these cases, the misappropriation 
of noncash assets is concealed through an internally-generated fraudulent completion. Such asset write-
offs are visible, are normally recorded in the general journal, and should be tested to determine the 
transaction's validity. 
In sum, there is a risk of asset misappropriation in completed transactions. Formally stated the risk 
proposition (R2) and preliminary audit planning implications (P2a and P2b) are: 
R2: There is a risk of financial statement misstatement from asset misappropriation in certain 
populations of completed transactions. 
P2a: Noncash completion of sales, and cash disbursements, should both be tested for the risk of 
cash misappropriation and concealment. 
P2b: Internally-generated asset write-offs should be tested for the risk of noncash asset 
misappropriation and concealment. 
Risk of Financial Statement Manipulation in Completed Transactions. The fraudulent 
manipulation of financial statements in completed transactions is highly unlikely. Such manipulations 
would be readily detected through routine testing for discrepancies in the ending cash balance.15 
Consequently, special audit procedures (beyond tests of cash) are normally not required to test for 
financial statement manipulation in completed transactions. 
Formally stated the risk proposition (R3) and preliminary audit planning implication (P3) are: 
R3: There is little risk of financial statement misstatement from financial statement 
manipulation in completed transactions, assuming routine tests of ending cash balances are 
performed. 
P3: Because of the low risk there is no compelling reason to plan audit tests of completed 
transactions for the risk of financial statement manipulation, beyond routine tests of ending 
cash balances. 
15 To illustrate, if "completed" sales are overstated by bogus (fraudulent) transactions then the cash account, 
because of double-entry accounting, must show a corresponding increase (since the transaction is completed) 
and must also be overstated. This fraudulent overstatement of cash would be detected through the auditor's 
routine test of the ending cash balance (e.g., bank confirmation and cutoff statement to test the year-end bank 
reconciliation). Similarly, if recorded "completed" purchases are understated (relative to actual cash 
disbursements) in order to fraudulently overstate income, then the ending balance of cash would show a 
discrepancy between cash per bank and cash per books. 
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Analysis of Incomplete Transactions 
Sources of risk in incomplete transactions are now analyzed. Random errors are evaluated first 
followed by an analysis of asset misappropriation and financial statement manipulation. 
Rusk of Random Errors in Incomplete Transactions. For completed transactions it was argued that 
random errors are unlikely to occur (see R1 and P1). In contrast, for incomplete transactions such 
errors could exist because the transactions have not yet been fully screened by both parties' internal 
control systems. By virtue of being incomplete, these random errors can be corrected and the 
transaction can be subsequently completed at the corrected amount. The detection of these random 
errors would result in an adjustment to the financial statements (if material). Random error could exist 
in any population of incomplete transactions (see Table 1). However, there is a special risk of random 
errors with internally-generated recognition such as year-end accruals because such transactions do not 
go through the same kind of rigorous internal control system as is used for routine, repetitive, high-
volume, externally-generated transactions. 
In sum, there is risk of random error in all populations of incomplete transactions. Formally stated the 
risk proposition (R4) and preliminary planning implication (P4) are: 
R4: There is a risk of financial statement misstatement from random error in all incomplete 
transactions, and especially in internally-generated transaction recognition. 
P4: There are compelling reasons to test all incomplete transactions (and especially internally-
generated transactions) for misstatement from random error. 
Risk of Asset Misappropriation in Incomplete Transactions. Recall that the concealment of 
misappropriated assets can only occur in completed transactions (see R2, P2a and P2b). By definition, 
then, there is no risk of asset misappropriation (and concealment) in incomplete transactions and hence 
no logical reason to test for such risk.16 Formally stated the risk proposition (R5) and preliminary audit 
planning implication (P5) are: 
R5: There is no risk of financial statement misstatement from asset misappropriation in 
incomplete transactions. 
P5: There is no logical reason to plan audit tests of incomplete transactions for the risk of 
misstatement from asset misappropriation. 
Risk of Financial Statement Manipulation in Incomplete Transactions. The fraudulent 
misstatement of assets and income can be concealed, at least temporarily, in incomplete transactions 
such as accounts receivable or inventory. More subtle manipulation could also occur through end-of-
period valuation adjustments to asset accounts, for example, the deliberate underestimation of the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts receivable. Internally-generated transactions involving year-end 
accruals and adjustments, and end-of-period asset valuation adjustments are particularly vulnerable 
because they are not subject to the same kind of internal control systems that apply to routine, high-
volume, externally-generated transactions. 
16 Outright theft of assets (i.e., unconcealed asset misappropriation) will by definition occur in incomplete 
transactions. However, as discussed in footnote 6 such thefts should either be detectable by the auditee's 
internal control system, or, failing that, by the auditor's tests of incomplete transactions for random errors or 
financial statement manipulation. Therefore, no special audit tests beyond those suggested by P4 above (and P6 
below) are necessary. 
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Thus there are compelling reasons to test all types of incomplete transactions for financial statement 
manipulation. Formally stated the risk proposition (R6) and preliminary audit planning implication 
(P6) are: 
R6: There is a risk of financial statement misstatement from financial statement manipulation 
in all incomplete transactions (and especially internally-generated transaction recognition). 
P6: There are compelling reasons to test all incomplete transactions (and especially internally-
generated ones) for the risk of misstatement from financial statement manipulation. 
RELATION OF THE MODEL TO SAS 31 ASSERTIONS 
Further insights can be gained by considering the model in terms of the SAS 31 assertions (existence, 
completeness, rights and obligations, valuation, presentation). These assertions can be thought of as the 
"properties" that make the financial statements presented fairly. In and of themselves, however, the 
assertions are not particularly instructive for audit planning. They do not specifically identify what 
should be audited, or why, from a risk perspective. 
The assertions are, however, very useful for clarifying the scope of audit testing objectives once an area 
for testing has been identified through risk-based audit planning. Our model of error and irregularities 
provides this by analyzing which populations of transaction are at risk and should be tested. The 
model's risk propositions R1-R3 and preliminary planning implications P1-P3 can then be related to 
SAS 31 assertions in the following specific manner: 
1. for the risk of asset misappropriation in completed transactions (R2), the primary assertion 
being tested (P2a and P2b) is existence or the validity of transactions that could conceal asset 
misappropriations (or relatedly the validity of the underlying control system that generates the 
transactions). 
2. for the risk of random error and/or financial statement manipulation (R4 and R6) in 
externally-generated incomplete transactions, the primary assertions being tested (P4 and P6) 
are the existence and completeness of incomplete transactions with respect to proper year-end 
recognition and cutoff. 
3. for the risk of random error and/or financial statement manipulation (R4 and R6) in 
internally-generated incomplete transactions, the primary assertions being tested (P4 and P6) 
are (a) existence, completeness and valuation of year-end accruals and adjusting entries and (b) 
the proper valuation of assets (i.e., end-of-period asset valuation adjustments). 
In sum, the model's preliminary audit planning implications (P2a, P2b, P4, and P6), clarify and provide 
guidance as to which assertions (i.e., "properties" of correctness) are relevant to which class of 
transactions.17 
17 We have not discussed the "disclosure" and "rights and obligations" assertions. In our view, the "rights and 
obligations" assertion can be interpreted as an elaboration of the existence and completeness assertions. That is, 
asset recognition has validity only if rights to the asset actually exist (existence). Similarly, liability recognition 
is complete only if all obligations are recognized that should be recognized (completeness). Therefore we do not 
treat it as a separate assertion with additional testing requirements. 
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AUDIT STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL AND SUBSTANTIVE TESTS 
The audit planning corollaries (P1-P6) of the model are quite specific and can be used as a general 
guide to preliminary audit planning. In particular, planning corollaries P2(a,b), P4 and P6 identify 
those specific populations of accounting transactions or account balances where some form of testing is 
normally appropriate, and P1, P3 and P5 identify situations where testing is not normally warranted. 
We now show that these results also lead to a systematic framework for assisting auditors in their 
strategic choice of (1) internal control system compliance tests or (2) substantive tests of transactions 
and account balances.18 Thus our model of errors and irregularities also provides a preliminary 
planning framework for identifying where control versus substantive testing is normally appropriate. 
As noted before, though, exactly how control and substantive testing is carried out (e.g., analytical 
procedures versus tests of details) is beyond the scope of the study's analysis. 
The analysis in this section uses the transaction categories developed for the model of errors and 
irregularities: completed-incomplete and internal-external. With these characterizations it is easy to 
assess the use of control versus substantive tests for the accounting populations specified by planning 
corollaries P2(a,b), P4 and P6. The analysis proceeds as follows. Completed transactions are analyzed 
first with a further distinction between internal and external. Incomplete transactions are then analyzed, 
again with a further distinction between internal and external. Results of the analysis are summarized 
in Table 3. 
Completed Transactions (Planning Corollary P2(a,b): 
Asset Misappropriation and Concealment) 
The model of errors and irregularities in Table 2 identifies specific populations of completed 
transactions that can be used to conceal asset misappropriation (see audit planning corollaries P2a and 
P2b). Two testing approaches are possible for these completed populations. In the first approach the 
auditor could test the underlying internal control system to determine that proper authorization 
procedures exist to assure the validity of these completed transactions. Alternatively, since the model 
identifies specific transactions in which concealment is possible, direct substantive tests of these 
transactions could be performed to determine the validity of the transactions and that they have not been 
used to conceal asset misappropriations.19 It will now be shown that this trade-off between control and 
substantive testing for asset misappropriation in completed transactions normally hinges on the internal 
versus external nature of transaction completion. 
18 Audit standards clearly demarcate these two categories of tests, for example, SAS 47 and SAS 55. In 
addition, the audit risk model establishes an inverse relationship between reliance on controls and reliance on 
evidence from substantive tests. 
19 By contrast control system tests are only indirect tests of underlying transactions based on an assessment of 
the quality of the control system. As discussed in SAS 47 good (bad) control systems are presumed to be 
correlated with a lower (higher) likelihood of material financial statement misstatements. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies have generally failed to support the proposition that good internal control systems lead to 
fewer financial statement misstatements (e.g., see Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1990, Waller 1993, Willingham and 
Wright 1985). The reason for this may be that internal control systems are effective in controlling transaction-
level processing of routine, high volume, externally-generated transactions, whereas misstatements (random and 
nonrandom) are more likely to occur in lower volume, internally-generated transactions that do not lend 
themselves to the same degree of process control. Thus one could observe strong internal controls over routine 
transactions, but if misstatements are primarily in internally-generated transactions (as the data by Kreutzfeldt 
and Wallace 1986 suggest) then there would be no correlation between the control system and the incidence of 
misstatements. 
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Table 3 
Implications for Control Versus Substantive Tests 
Transaction 
Type 
Model's 
Control 
Tests 
Substantive 
Tests 
Planning 
Corollaries 
Audit 
Concerns 
Completed: 
Internal 
External 
Incomplete: 
Internal 
External 
No 
Yes -Trade-offs-
No 
Yes -Trade-offs-
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
P2(a,b) 
P4, P6 
Misappropriation 
& Concealment 
Random Error & 
Financial 
Statement 
Manipulation 
Internally-Recognized Completed Transactions. 
Asset misappropriations in completed transactions can occur through certain internally-generated and 
low-volume transactions that are recorded in the general journal such as the noncash completion of 
sales through bad debt write-offs or through other asset write-offs. These types of transactions do not 
lend themselves to the same degree of internal processing controls as do externally-generated high-
volume transactions. For this reason it normally would be more appropriate for the auditor to rely on 
direct substantive tests of these transactions. In other words it would not be necessary to perform 
control tests relating to these particular populations of transactions since they can be directly tested 
through substantive tests. 
Externally-Recognized Completed Transactions. Control tests (and hence internal control reliance) 
for asset misappropriation in completed transactions may be efficient and effective for populations of 
externally completed transactions. These completions are typically high volume in nature and are 
recorded in special journals. For example, high-volume externally completed purchase transactions 
(see testing corollary P2a) might be efficiently and effectively audited via control tests (rather than 
direct substantive transaction tests). The same may also be true of the external completion of sales 
through high-volume returns and allowances. 
Finally, it is possible that the optimal audit strategy would be a mix of control tests and substantive tests 
of transactions. However, the nature of these trade-offs is beyond the scope of this study.20 
20 There has been some prior research on combining evidence from control tests and substantive tests (e.g., 
Bailey 1981, Grimlund 1982, Kinney 1975, Smieliauskas 1985), but little formal modelling of the trade-offs in 
deriving an optimal audit strategy. Our approach to this question identifies where control tests logically make 
sense and where they do not. Only where control tests are logical is there a need for further analysis of what the 
optimal trade-off is regarding the amount of evidence from control tests and substantive tests, and the 
development of algorithms for combining such evidence. 
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Incomplete Transactions (Planning Corollaries P4 and P6: Misstatements from Random Error 
& Financial Statement Manipulation) 
The model of errors and irregularities (summarized in Table 2) has two auditing planning 
corollaries with respect to incomplete transactions, P4 concerning the risk of random errors and P6 
concerning the risk of financial statement manipulation. The analysis again shows that the choice of 
control versus substantive test hinges on whether the recognition is internally or externally generated. 
Internally-Recognized Incomplete Transactions. Internally-generated incomplete transactions are 
year-end accruals and adjusting entries, self-constructed assets, internal inventory transfers, and end-of-
period asset valuation adjustments. With the possible exception of inventory transfers, these are 
normally low-volume transactions that are recorded in the general journal. These transactions are not 
therefore effectively controlled by processing-oriented transaction-level control systems. 
By definition, then, internal transactions are judgmental items, non-routine (low volume) in nature, and 
recorded in the general journal rather than high-volume special journals. As a result, internal control 
system reliability (control risk) is unlikely to be an effective audit approach. Instead, audit testing must 
necessarily rely on (1) substantive tests of transactions (in the case of year-end accruals and adjusting 
entries) and (2) substantive tests of asset balances (in the case of self-constructed assets, internal 
inventory transfers, and end-of-period asset valuation adjustments). 
Externally-Recognized Incomplete Transactions. The primary source of misstatement in externally-
generated incomplete transactions is improper recognition and cutoff at year end. The particular risks 
are: 
1. the "existence" assertion, or whether the assets/revenues that were recognized should have 
been recognized. 
2. the "completeness" assertion, or whether all liabilities/expenses that should have been 
recognized were in fact recognized. 
These types of transactions are normally recorded in high-volume special journals and may be 
effectively controlled by well-defined processing-level transaction control systems identified by the 
auditor's preliminary review of controls. In such cases, control system reliance and testing may be 
efficient and effective in evaluating the likelihood of either random errors or financial statement 
manipulation. 
Thus there is a potentially strong role for control testing with a resultant cutback in substantive testing 
in these externally-recognized incomplete transactions. Again, though, the optimal strategy may be a 
mix of both control and substantive tests and the precise nature of these trade-offs is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study has developed a transaction-based model of financial statement misstatements to aid in risk-
based planning of audit tests. The model analyzes the risk of misstatements from random error, asset 
misappropriation, or financial statement manipulation in the specific populations of accounting 
transactions and account balances that constitute the financial statements. The results of our model 
identify which transactions should be tested for particular sources of misstatements. 
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Two broad audit testing objectives are delineated. First, populations of completed transactions are 
tested for the risk of asset misappropriation. Second, populations of incomplete transactions are tested 
jointly for the risk of random error and financial statement manipulation. Insights from the model are 
then used to consider the overall audit strategy suggested by the audit risk model in SAS 47. 
Specifically, our analysis helps to clarify the respective roles of control tests versus substantive tests 
from an audit planning perspective. 
It has been seen that our model of errors and irregularities identifies well defined classes of populations 
for which some form of testing is normally appropriate. This result is summarized in Table 2. The 
distinctive feature of the model (i.e., incomplete/complete and internal/external transactions) has then 
proven useful in further classifying the general form of testing (i.e., control/substantive). Table 3 
summarizes this analysis. 
The study has a number of implications for the potential improvement of audit practice. First, the 
model of errors and irregularities could be used as a general training tool for understanding inherent risk 
of misstatements. Second, it might potentially improve audit effectiveness when formally used as a 
decision aid for audit planning in the design of appropriate (relevant) tests. Third, audit planning based 
on the study's model might improve audit efficiency because the model demarcates what needs to be 
tested and, by implication, what need not be tested. Fourth, the model aids in evaluating how testing 
should be efficiently and effectively undertaken with regard to control tests or substantive tests or a 
combination of both. 
As teachers of auditing we also believe our model of errors and irregularities has positive pedagogical 
implications for three difficult topics in auditing: the SAS 31 assertions, the SAS 47 audit risk model, 
and internal control evaluation and SASs 55 and 78. Our experience is that students normally have 
some problems in understanding the assertions in SAS 31 because of their abstractness and generality. 
The model of errors and irregularities developed in this study overcomes this pedagogical problem by 
applying the assertions to context-specific situations and logically relating specific assertions to 
particular sources of misstatements in specific populations of transactions. 
With regard to SAS 47, the basic logic of the audit risk model is easily grasped. However, students 
struggle to understand the wider implications of the model for audit planning and testing. Our model of 
errors and irregularities helps by clarifying the strategic role of control tests and substantive tests (and 
their trade-offs) in testing those populations of accounting transactions and account balances identified 
in the model. 
Internal control evaluation is another difficult aspect of an auditing course. Our model facilitates this 
by identifying more specifically where internal control reliance matters and should normally be tested 
(and why). The internal control insights from our model are also consistent with the recommended 
methodology for auditing internal control (see SAS 55). The essential first step in that process is to 
identify what misstatements can occur (and why) which is exactly what our model does. 
The model of errors and irregularities developed in this study also suggests a number of issues for 
follow-up evaluation and/or empirical testing. We simply present these in the form of questions. First, 
can the model be used as an effective pedagogical and training tool for understanding the risk of 
misstatements and for risk-based audit planning? Second, can the model be operationalized for use in 
the field as a decision aid for risk-based planning of audit tests and for making strategic choices 
between control and substantive tests? Third, would the audit testing suggested by the model lead to 
more efficient auditing (by identifying what should be audited and why)? Fourth, are there currently 
routine audit tests being performed that are inconsistent with the predictions of our model and which 
therefore might be unnecessary? 
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We believe our model of errors and irregularities has a rich potential for the auditing discipline in each 
of the above areas. The logical and structured understanding it brings to risk analysis, and the role it 
plays in risk-based preliminary audit planning, are foundational issues that have not been rigorously 
investigated in the auditing literature. A better understanding of these foundational issues is essential 
for the further development of risk-based auditing. 
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